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A B S T R A C T
Objective: We explored the impact of aﬀect on cognitive control as this relates to individual diﬀerences in af-
fective instability and substance use. Toward this end, we examined how diﬀerent dimensions of aﬀective in-
stability interact to predict substance misuse and the eﬀect of this on two event-related potential components,
the reward positivity and the late positive potential, which are said to reﬂect the neural mechanisms of reward
and emotion processing, respectively.
Methods: We recorded the ongoing electroencephalogram from undergraduate students as they navigated two T-
maze tasks in search of rewards. One of the tasks included neutral, pleasant, and unpleasant pictures from the
International Aﬀective Picture System. Participants also completed several questionnaires pertaining to sub-
stance use and personality.
Results: A principal components analysis revealed a factor related to aﬀective instability, which we named re-
activity. This factor signiﬁcantly predicted increased substance use. Individuals reporting higher levels of af-
fective reactivity also displayed a larger reward positivity following stimuli with emotional content.
Conclusion: The current study uncovered a group of high-risk substance users who were characterized by greater
levels of aﬀective reactivity and context-speciﬁc increased sensitivity to rewards.
Signiﬁcance: These results help to elucidate the complex factors underlying substance use and may facilitate the
creation of individually-tailored treatment programs for those struggling with substance use disorders.
1. Introduction
Recent decades have seen a surge of research in the area of cognitive
control, but only recently have researchers become interested in
studying the relationship between cognitive control, aﬀect, and moti-
vation. These relationships are particularly important within the con-
text of mental health, as they may interact in a number of psychological
disorders such as substance use disorders (SUDs). Individuals with SUDs
typically demonstrate impairments in cognitive control and many also
struggle with emotional experiences (American Psychiatric Association,
2013); however, the relationship between cognitive control and aﬀect
within substance use is not well understood. Here we explored the
impact of individual diﬀerences in aﬀect on cognitive control. We ﬁrst
examined the relationship between facets of aﬀective instability and
substance use in a typical undergraduate population. We then used
event-related potentials (ERPs) to assess reward and emotion proces-
sing in this population to examine diﬀerences in these neural processes
as a function of aﬀective instability and substance use. In what follows
we elaborate on both of these objectives.
1.1. Aﬀect, cognitive control, and substance use
The eﬀect of emotional diﬃculties on the development and main-
tenance of SUDs is multifaceted. Aﬀective psychopathologies such as
depression and anxiety disorders (e.g., panic disorder) have high rates
of comorbid SUDs (American Psychiatry Association, 2013). Individuals
diagnosed with SUDs have demonstrated deﬁcits in their ability to ex-
press and experience emotions (Arcos et al., 2008). Unique roles for
both positive and negative aﬀect have been proposed in the initiation
and maintenance of SUDs. For example, individuals experiencing ne-
gative emotions may begin using substances in order to distract from,
cope with, or improve unpleasant feelings such as anxiety, sadness, and
pain (Cheetham et al., 2010; Measelle et al., 2006). Alternatively,
substance use may be maintained by a desire to avoid the negative
aﬀective state associated with withdrawal (Kassel et al., 2007). Positive
emotions have also been suggested to play a role in SUDs as individuals
who experience greater levels of positive aﬀect are more likely to en-
gage in risky behaviour and may seek out substances for their hedonic
properties (Cheetham et al., 2010).
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A key area of interest in aﬀect and cognitive control research lies in
emotional regulation, which refers to the ability of an individual to
adaptively modulate or control their aﬀective responses to stimuli or
situations. Cole et al. (1994) suggested that access to a range of emo-
tions, ﬂexible modulation of intensity and duration of emotions, and the
ability to transition between diﬀerent emotions are important dimen-
sions when characterizing emotional regulation. The relationship be-
tween emotional regulation and psychological diﬃculties often lies in
the inability of an individual to regulate their emotional response (i.e.
emotional dysregulation), which is a critical component of psycho-
pathologies including mood and substance-related disorders (Berking
and Wupperman, 2012). At the centre of emotional dysregulation is the
concept of aﬀective instability. Aﬀective instability has traditionally been
conceptualized and deﬁned as a symptom or diﬃculty observed in in-
dividuals with borderline personality disorder (BPD) (Nica and Links,
2009). Recently, researchers and clinicians have also recognized the
presence of aﬀective instability in a number of other clinical disorders,
including attention-deﬁcit hyperactivity disorder, bipolar disorder,
major depressive disorder, eating disorders, post-traumatic stress dis-
order, and anxiety disorders (Renaud and Zacchia, 2012; Marwaha
et al., 2014). Yet, despite evidence of aﬀective instability being an
important symptom in many psychological disorders associated with
co-morbid substance misuse, there has been very little research ex-
amining the role of aﬀective instability in SUDs.
Aﬀective instability has been deﬁned as “rapid oscillations of in-
tense aﬀect, with a diﬃculty in regulating these oscillations or their
behavioural consequences” (Marwaha et al., 2014). Despite aﬀective
instability being such an important psychological construct, it is com-
plicated to measure. In a recent systematic review, Marwaha et al.
(2014) observed that no single measure comprehensively assesses af-
fective instability and therefore recommended a combination of current
measures for accurate assessment. Two core dimensions of aﬀective
instability include the intensity with which an individual experiences
their emotions, and the frequency with which an individual's aﬀective
experience changes. These dimensions have been commonly assessed
by self-report questionnaires developed to evaluate individuals' sub-
jective experience of aﬀect intensity and lability: the Aﬀect Intensity
Measure (AIM) (Larsen and Diener, 1987) and the Aﬀective Lability
Scale (ALS) (Harvey et al., 1989) (Table 1). Both measures have been
extensively used to study aﬀective intensity and lability in non-clinical
(Botella et al., 2011; Pearson et al., 2015; Veilleux et al., 2014; Xu et al.,
2016) and clinical populations (see Marwaha et al., 2014 for review).
Studies looking at the relationship between aﬀect intensity and la-
bility and SUDs are relatively sparse. Thorberg and Lyvers (2006) found
that individuals with a history of addiction reported higher levels of
aﬀect intensity than non-addicted individuals. In a sample of in-
dividuals in treatment for SUDs, aﬀective lability was associated with
alcohol dependence (Simons et al., 2005). Similarly, college students
reporting greater aﬀective lability were more likely to develop diﬃ-
culties with alcohol dependence (Simons et al., 2009). Aﬀective lability
has also been found to signiﬁcantly correlate with alcohol and cannabis
use disorders in individuals with bipolar disorder (Lagerberg et al.,
2017).
Another component related to aﬀective intensity and lability, which
has not been traditionally considered in the aﬀective instability litera-
ture, is that of urgency. Urgency has been deﬁned as a “disposition to
engage in rash action when experiencing extreme positive and negative
aﬀect” and has been researched with regard to increased rates of sub-
stance use (Cyders and Smith, 2007, 2008). The construct of urgency
arose from research focused on impulsivity and was parsed into positive
and negative urgency, which are included as factors in the UPPS-P
Impulsive Behavior Scale (Cyders et al., 2007; Whiteside et al., 2005;
Whiteside and Lynam, 2001). Positive urgency measures the likelihood
that an individual will act impulsively when experiencing positive
emotions, whereas negative urgency refers to the tendency to act rashly
in response to distress (Table 1). Both positive and negative urgency are
associated with higher risk of substance misuse. A recent meta-analysis
found that among personality traits related to impulsivity, negative
urgency was the strongest predictor of problematic alcohol consump-
tion (Coskunpinar et al., 2013a). Individuals reporting higher levels of
positive urgency were found to consume a greater quantity of alcohol
following a high-activation positive mood induction (Dinc and Cooper,
2015). Only one study to date has looked at the relationship between
urgency and aﬀective lability and concluded that negative urgency may
mediate the eﬀects of lability on problematic alcohol use (Coskunpinar
et al., 2013b). Taken together, the AIM, ALS, and positive and negative
urgency assess important aspects of aﬀective instability: the intensity
with which emotions are experienced, the speed at which emotions
change, and how responsive an individual is to their emotions.
Deﬁning and measuring aﬀective instability within the context of
clinical disorders is complicated by the fact that a number of other
symptoms and diﬃculties contribute to the constellation of any given
psychological disorder. For example, aﬀective instability is considered a
core diﬃculty in BPD, but individuals with BPD also demonstrate
identity disturbance, marked interpersonal diﬃculties, and recurrent
suicidal behaviours (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Research
investigating aﬀective instability has focused on its role in clinical
disorders, perhaps because of a traditionally categorical approach to
deﬁning and diagnosing mental health disorders. Recent proposals have
emphasized that because personality traits vary along continua, clin-
icians should adopt a dimensional approach to diagnosing personality
disorders (Krueger et al., 2011; Morey et al., 2006; Suzuki et al., 2015).
The dimensional approach holds that individual diﬀerences in these
traits become clinically signiﬁcant only when their expression is ex-
treme, rigid, and maladaptive. Certain personality traits, such as im-
pulsivity, sensation seeking, and even personality disorders such as
Table 1
Deﬁnitions of aﬀective dimensions, self-report measures to assess each dimension, and an example item from each questionnaire.
Deﬁnition Measure Example question
Aﬀective
instability
Rapid oscillations of intense aﬀect, with a diﬃculty in
regulating these oscillations or their behavioural
consequences (Marwaha et al., 2014; also see Renaud
and Zacchia, 2012)
Multidimensional and requires multiple self-
report questionnaires to assess.
See below for example questions from self-report
questionnaires that assess speciﬁc dimensions of
aﬀective instability.
Aﬀect intensity A stable individual diﬀerence in the typical intensity with
which individuals experience their emotions (Larsen &
Diener, 1987)
Aﬀect Intensity Measure (AIM) (Larsen and
Diener, 1987)
‘When something good happens, I am usually
much more jubilant than others.’
Aﬀective lability Rapid shifts in outward emotional expressions (Look
et al., 2010)
Aﬀective Lability Scale (ALS) (Harvey et al.,
1989), Aﬀective Lability Scale – 18 (ALS-18)
(Look et al., 2010)
‘I switch back and forth between being extremely
energetic and having so little energy that it's a
huge eﬀort just to get where I'm going.’
Negative urgency The tendency to engage in rash action in response to
extreme negative aﬀect (Cyders and Smith, 2008)
UPPS-P Impulsive Behavior Scale (UPPS-P)
(Cyders et al., 2007)
‘When I feel bad, I will often do things I later
regret in order to make myself feel better now.’
Positive urgency The tendency to engage in rash action in response to
extreme positive aﬀect (Cyders and Smith, 2008)
UPPS-P Impulsive Behavior Scale (UPPS-P)
(Cyders et al., 2007)
‘When overjoyed, I feel like I can't stop myself
from going overboard.’
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BPD, can provide information regarding treatment planning and pre-
dicting the course and outcome of individuals with SUDs (American
Psychiatric Association, 2013). For example, BPD is a strong predictor
of persistence of SUDs (Hasin et al., 2011); however, research has failed
to demonstrate that aﬀective instability is speciﬁc to BPD. This supports
the idea that aﬀective instability is a transdiagnostic construct that may
increase risky substance use (Ebner-Priemer et al., 2016). In particular,
Ebner-Priemer and colleagues proposed a need for future research to
look at basic physiological processes in order to improve our under-
standing of dynamic aﬀective mechanisms: They argued that if aﬀective
instability is conceptualized as a trait, it would exist on a continuum
between normative and pathological expression, yet research on the
normative end of the spectrum is lacking.
Thus, the roles of diﬀerent aspects of aﬀective instability on sub-
stance use and reward processing are not well understood. The over-
arching purpose of the current study was to assess whether individuals
with higher levels of aﬀective instability are more likely to engage in
problematic substance use, and to investigate the associated neural
mechanisms of reward and emotion processing. To this end, we sought
to examine components of aﬀective instability in a non-clinical popu-
lation. We examined the relationship between the AIM, ALS, and po-
sitive and negative urgency subscales from the UPPS-P (see Table 1), as
well as how these dimensions correlate with personality traits pre-
viously determined to increase risk for substance use (SURPS, Woicik
et al., 2009). To be speciﬁc, we assessed the relationship between facets
of aﬀective instability and personality traits associated with risky sub-
stance use to determine if aﬀective instability represents a unqiue
personality risk factor.
Event Related Potentials.
Next, we also explored the eﬀect of aﬀective instability and sub-
stance use on neural mechanisms of reward and emotion processing.
The impact of SUDs may be evident in a component of the ERP, the
reward positivity (formerly or more commonly known as the feedback
related negativity or FRN). The reward positivity is said to reﬂect the
impact of phasic dopamine (DA) increases and decreases on the anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC), an area believed to be responsible for reward
processing and cognitive control (Holroyd and Coles, 2002; Holroyd
and Yeung, 2012; see also Walsh and Anderson, 2012). The reward
positivity has previously been used to explore the role of cognitive
control in individuals reporting substance dependence. For example, a
truncated reward positivity observed in undergraduate students re-
porting substance dependence was taken as evidence that individuals
with SUDs have impaired reward processing (Baker et al., 2011). A
subsequent study demonstrated that genetically-determined over-ex-
pression of the DA DRD4 receptor, which is highly expressed in the ACC
and frontal cortex, can increase vulnerability to substance misuse by
indirectly altering ACC response to feedback (Baker et al., 2016a).
Further, a follow-up study examined the reward positivity in response
to monetary and cigarette rewards in a sample of cigarette smokers. A
critical condition found that the reward positivity elicited by cigarette
rewards was larger than the reward positivity elicited by monetary
rewards, suggesting that in substance users, drug-related rewards en-
gage the ACC more strongly than do non-drug related rewards (i.e.,
money) (Baker et al., 2016b; see also Baker et al., 2017).
Complicating the picture is the ﬁnding that individual diﬀerences in
personality have been observed to impact proclivity to substance use
and may mediate the relationship of SUDs and reward processing. For
example, in addition to evidence for impaired DA-dependent reward
processing in individuals with SUDs, Baker et al. (2011) also identiﬁed
that individuals scoring high on a self-report measure of depression-
proneness displayed disrupted error learning. Indeed, the magnitude of
the reward positivity has been shown to be sensitive to a number of
individual diﬀerences including depression (Proudﬁt, 2015; Umemoto
and Holroyd, 2017), anhedonia (Liu et al., 2014; Parvaz et al., 2016),
extraversion (Cooper et al., 2014), impulsivity (Onoda et al., 2010;
Schmidt et al., 2017), and sensation seeking (Zheng and Liu, 2015).
Many of these individual diﬀerences or personality traits are linked
with increased risk for substance misuse, including impulsivity, sensa-
tion seeking, hopelessness, and anxiety sensitivity (Woicik et al., 2009).
To date, there has been limited research investigating the role of af-
fective instability in SUDs and its impact on the reward positivity.
Of relevance to the current experiment, a recent fMRI study found
that emotional stimuli, presented independently of a learning task,
were associated with an enhanced response in the ventral striatum at
the time of feedback delivery; this enhanced response was interpreted
as a reward prediction error (RPE) signal (i.e., the diﬀerence between
actual and predicted reward), perhaps reﬂecting DA modulation of the
ventral striatum (Watanabe et al., 2013). In this study, each trial of a
probabilistic trial-and-error learning task began with the presentation
of an image of either a fearful or neutral face. The investigators found
greater activation in the ventral striatum when unexpected reward
outcomes were presented following exposure to fearful faces in com-
parison to neutral faces. This eﬀect remained after corrections were
made for reward size and expected value. Through a psychophysiolo-
gical interaction analysis, Watanabe and colleagues concluded that
amygdala activation in response to emotional stimuli was functionally
linked with RPE signals produced in the striatum. They interpreted the
results as evidence that humans can utilize emotional information from
the environment in order to maximize reward.
In order to investigate the impact of individual diﬀerences on
emotion processing, we recorded the electroencephalogram (EEG) from
subjects engaged in modiﬁed version of the task paradigm by Watanabe
et al. (2013). This served two purposes. First, we examined whether
reward positivity amplitude would replicate the previous observation of
an increased striatal RPE signal following presentation of task-unrelated
emotional stimuli. Second, we examined whether the amplitude of the
reward positivity would reﬂect individual diﬀerences in aﬀective in-
stability, and whether these diﬀerences would interact with rates of
substance use. To be speciﬁc, as the role of aﬀective instability in
substance use is poorly understood, we sought to determine whether
the neural mechanisms of substance use would diﬀer between high-risk
substance users reporting high levels of aﬀective instability and those
reporting low aﬀective instability. Notably, Watanabe and colleagues
did not assess individual diﬀerences that may impact emotional pro-
cessing.
Further, to the best of our knowledge, no studies have examined the
eﬀect of individual diﬀerences in aﬀective processing on electro-
physiological measures of emotion processing. Therefore, we also ex-
plored whether individual diﬀerences in aﬀective instability would be
reﬂected in the amplitudes of the P300 and late positive potential
(LPP). The P300, a positive deﬂection in the EEG observed between 300
and 600ms following stimulus presentation that is maximal at parietal
electrode sites (Sutton et al., 1965), is believed to reﬂect attentional
processes demanded by environmentally salient information. The am-
plitude of the P300 has been observed to increase following the pre-
sentation of emotional stimuli in comparison with neutral stimuli,
evidently because emotional stimuli are automatically processed as
environmentally salient (see Hajcak et al., 2010; Hajcak et al., 2012 for
review).
The LPP is a sustained positive deﬂection similar to the P300 that
follows the presentation of pleasant and unpleasant stimuli and that is
absent or reduced following neutral stimuli. It is larger for more intense
or arousing stimuli (Cuthbert et al., 2000; Schupp et al., 2000), does not
habituate to repeated presentation of emotional stimuli, and appears to
be a relatively stable individual trait (Codispoti et al., 2006). The LPP
has been used to investigate substance users' response to substance-
related stimuli. A recent meta-analysis found evidence for an increased
LPP in response to substance-related stimuli in users (Littel et al., 2012)
including cocaine and cigarettes (Minnix et al., 2013). The LPP has also
been used to predict the likeliness of cigarette smokers remaining ab-
stinent from smoking. While all smokers displayed increased LPPs in
response to cigarette stimuli, a group of smokers that also demonstrated
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a blunted LPP to intrinsically pleasant pictures were less likely to suc-
cessfully abstain from smoking in comparison to a group with a typical
LPP to pleasant stimuli (Versace et al., 2012). This ﬁnding was re-
plicated in young smokers without a long history of substance use
(Engelmann et al., 2016), and in a group of current cocaine users
(Dunning et al., 2011). Noteworthy is the ﬁnding that the LPP gener-
ated by non-substance related stimuli predicted individual diﬀerences in
current substance use and the likeliness of remaining abstinent. This
raises the question of whether reduced LPP to pleasant pictures is
perhaps driven by underlying individual diﬀerences in aﬀective in-
stability. To the best of our knowledge, no studies to date have ex-
amined the impact of individual diﬀerences in aﬀect intensity, lability,
and urgency on the LPP in either substance users or non-users.
1.2. Summary and aims
To summarize, we recorded the EEG from subjects engaged in both a
standard reward positivity task (Standard T-maze task) and in a reward
positivity task modiﬁed to include emotional cues (Emotion-T maze task)
in order to investigate the relationships between aﬀective instability,
substance use, and neural mechanisms of reward and emotion proces-
sing as measured with the reward positivity, P300, and LPP. First, we
predicted that individuals reporting higher levels of aﬀective instability
(i.e. aﬀective lability, intensity, and urgency) would be more likely to
report higher rates of substance use. Second, we predicted that we
would replicate a common result of several previous studies, namely,
that individuals reporting higher rates of substance use would display a
truncated reward positivity in the Standard T-maze task (Baker, 2012;
Baker et al., 2011, 2017; Baker et al., 2016b). Third, based on the re-
sults of Watanabe et al. (2013) – who using fMRI found an increased
RPE signal following task-independent emotional stimuli – we expected
that the reward positivity amplitude in the Emotion T-maze would be
larger following trials in which participants were presented with an
emotionally salient picture. Fourth, as the reward positivity has been
demonstrated to be sensitive to a number of individual diﬀerences (i.e.,
reward sensitivity), we predicted that individuals reporting greater af-
fective instability would be more sensitive to rewarding stimuli, which
would be evident in larger electrophysiological responses to reward
feedback (as elicited by the Standard T-Maze task). Fifth, we expected
the amplitude of the reward positivity following emotional stimuli (as
elicited by the Emotion T-Maze task) to be exaggerated in individuals
reporting high levels of aﬀective instability.
Putting these predictions together, we predicted that greater aﬀec-
tive instability would ‘normalize’ reward positivity amplitude in high-
risk substance users, which is otherwise truncated in this population.
Speciﬁcally, we predicted reward positivity amplitude in individuals
reporting both risky substance use and high aﬀective instability would
be larger than the amplitude of the reward positivity in those reporting
risky substance use and low aﬀective instability and that this eﬀect
would be particularly evident following emotionally valent pictures in
the Emotion T-Maze task. Finally, we predicted that individuals re-
porting high levels of aﬀective instability would also have larger elec-
trophysiological responses to emotion processing, as reﬂected in the
amplitudes of the P300 and LPP.
2. Methods
2.1. Participants
Participants were students at the University of Victoria who re-
ceived extra credit in an undergraduate psychology course for their
participation. In order to participate, individuals were required to have
normal or corrected-to-normal vision, no known history of neurological
impairments and be ﬂuent in English. In addition, all participants were
given a performance-related monetary bonus of approximately CDN
$10 at the completion of the experiment (see below). All participants
provided written informed consent.
Two previous studies with undergraduate student participants at the
University of Victoria (Baker, 2012; Baker et al., 2011) found large
eﬀect sizes (Cohen's d= 0.91 and 0.87, respectively) of substance use
on the reward positivity. A power analysis using the average eﬀect size
(Cohen's D=0.89) indicated a minimum of 68 participants were
needed to achieve statistical power of 0.8.
A total of 84 undergraduate students participated in the experiment.
Two participants over 40 years old were excluded from analysis as
outliers in age. Data were analyzed for 50 females and 32 males
(n=82) between the ages of 18–28 years (M=21.30, SD=2.47). The
experiment was approved by the human research ethics board at the
University of Victoria and was conducted in accordance with the ethical
standards prescribed in the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki.
2.2. Procedure
Participants completed a Standard T-Maze task, immediately fol-
lowed by an Emotion T-Maze task while the EEG was recorded from
electrodes placed on their scalp. After completing both tasks, the
electrodes were removed and participants completed several ques-
tionnaires. Administration of the tasks and questionnaires all took place
in private testing rooms in the ERP laboratory. During data collection,
participants were alone in the testing room and seated comfortably in
front of a computer monitor. As part of the set up and consent process,
all participants were informed of the presence of a video camera that




During the ﬁrst task, participants navigated their way through a
simple T-shaped “virtual maze” to ﬁnd rewards. The T-maze task is a
pseudo-trial and error learning task that has been demonstrated to elicit
a robust reward positivity (Baker and Holroyd, 2009; Baker et al., 2011;
Lukie et al., 2014). Each trial began with an image of the stem alley of
the T-maze, which remained on the screen for 1000ms (see Fig. 1).
Subsequently, a green double arrow appeared at the end of the alley
indicating that the participant could turn either left or right, and re-
mained on the screen until the participant pressed a corresponding
button on a keyboard (button 1 for left and button 2 for right). Fol-
lowing the choice, the image of the selected alley appeared on the
screen for 500ms, followed by an image of either an apple or an orange
presented at central ﬁxation over the alley (1000ms). At the beginning
of the task, participants were informed that one image (apple or or-
ange) indicated that they had won 5 cents (reward feedback) and the
other image was worth 0 cents (no-reward feedback). Reward stimuli
were counterbalanced across participants. On each trial, the type of
feedback stimulus was randomly selected, meaning there was a 50%
probability of receiving reward or no-reward feedback, however par-
ticipants were not informed of this contingency. Participants were told
they would receive the total amount of money found in the maze at the
end of the experiment and were encouraged to navigate the maze in a
way that would maximize their earnings. The task was comprised of
two blocks containing 50 trials each. Blocks were separated with a rest
break, at which time the experimenter checked on the participant and
conﬁrmed the amount of money accumulated so far. The duration of
the rest break was controlled by the participant.
2.3.2. Emotion T-maze
Following the Standard T-maze task, participants were given a si-
milar task in which, prior to the appearance of the green double arrow
on the screen, a picture from the International Aﬀective Picture System
(IAPS) (Lang et al., 2008) was displayed at central ﬁxation (overlaid on
the alley image) for 1000ms (see Fig. 2). A total of 60 pictures
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Fig. 1. The standard T-maze task, a pseudo-trial and error learning task that elicits robust reward positivities. Images on the top depict the layout of the task, while
the images on the bottom display the sequence of events during a single trial (adapted from Baker and Holroyd, 2009).
Fig. 2. Sequence and timing of stimuli in the emotion T-maze task. Note the picture depicted is for illustrative purposes only and was not one of the pictures from the
IAPS, nor was it used in the task.
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comprising 20 neutral, 20 pleasant and 20 unpleasant images were
selected. Pictures from the IAPS were selected based on the valence and
arousal ratings included with the stimuli in the technical manual. In
accordance with local ethics approval for the experiment, images with
high arousal ratings containing erotica or mutilation were excluded
from the sets. Participants were informed of the nature of the images
prior to beginning the experiment and were instructed to pay attention
to the picture while it was on the screen. Immediately following the
IAPS picture, the green double arrow appeared on the screen, indicating
to participants they could select either the left or right alley. This image
was followed by an image of the base alley for 500ms, and then an
image of the selected alley remained on the screen for 1000ms. Next,
feedback stimuli indicating whether or not they had found a reward
(apple or orange) appeared on the screen for 1000ms. Finally, the base
alley appeared for 1000ms and then the next trial began. Note that the
mappings between feedback stimuli and reward types remained con-
sistent for each participant across the two T-maze tasks.
Participants completed a total of ﬁve blocks consisting of 60 trials
per block, for a total of 300 trials. During each block, participants were
shown each of the 60 pictures one time. Pictures were selected at
random and were not linked with the subsequent reward or no-reward
feedback, which occurred with equal (50%) probabilities. Participants
were not told that the mappings were random and were encouraged to
navigate the maze in a way that maximized their earnings. Between
blocks, participants were provided with a self-controlled rest break,
during which the experimenter summarized the participants' accumu-
lated earnings. Note that at the end of the 300 trials, each participant
had seen the 60 pictures ﬁve times each, resulting in 100 trials of each
the neutral, pleasant and unpleasant picture conditions.
2.3.3. Questionnaires
After both tasks were completed, participants were asked to com-
plete a computer-based survey comprised of ﬁve questionnaires. Each
participant completed the survey privately in the ERP lab testing room
and all questionnaire data were anonymized by use of a participant
number. On average, participants took between 15 and 20min to
complete the computerized survey.
First, participants completed the Alcohol, Smoking and Substance
Involvement Screening Test V3.0 (ASSIST V3.0) (Humeniuk et al.,
2010; Humeniuk et al., 2008), which was used in previous reward
positivity studies of substance dependence (Baker et al., 2011; Baker
et al., 2013). The ASSIST is a screening test designed by the World
Health Organization (WHO) to detect substance use and related diﬃ-
culties in primary medical care settings. Speciﬁcally, the ASSIST screens
use of tobacco, alcohol, cannabis, cocaine, amphetamines, inhalants,
sedative, hallucinogens, opioids and “other drugs”, providing a robust
measure of polysubstance use. The ASSIST assesses a variety of factors
related to substance dependence, including frequency of substance use
in the past three months, cravings, negative consequences as a result of
substance use, and evidence of loss of control. The ASSIST only requires
participants to answer questions pertaining to substances they reported
using and uses a weighted scoring system to generate substance-speciﬁc
risk scores. Recommended cut oﬀ scores for ‘low risk’ is ≤3 for all
substances except alcohol, which has a cut oﬀ ≤10, ‘moderate risk’
scores include the range of 4–26 or 11–26 for alcohol, any substance
speciﬁc score≥ 27 is considered ‘high risk’ (Humeniuk et al., 2008).
Additionally, an ‘overall substance use’ score was calculated by sum-
ming the substance speciﬁc scores; in previous studies (Baker, 2012;
Baker et al., 2011, 2017; Baker et al., 2016b) this was referred to as the
Global Continuum of Risk score (GCR). For the current study, the AS-
SIST V3.0 was modiﬁed from paper to a computerized format.
Three additional questionnaires assessed aspects of aﬀective in-
stability. These consisted of a short form of the Aﬀective Lability Scale –
18 (ALS-18) (Look et al., 2010; Oliver and Simons, 2004), the Aﬀect
Intensity Measure (AIM) (Larsen and Diener, 1987) and the UPPS-P
Impulsive Behavior Scale (UPPS-P) (Cyders et al., 2007; Whiteside
et al., 2005).
The ALS-18 was originally developed as a 56-item measure for use
with a non-clinical population (Harvey et al., 1989). Participants re-
spond using a four-point Likert scale. The purpose of the measure is to
identify patterns of instability in aﬀect or the frequency and intensity of
changes in aﬀect. The original measure has been shown to have good
internal consistency, test-retest reliability and discriminant validity
(Harvey et al., 1989). More recently the ALS was modiﬁed to a shorter
version comprised of 18 items from the original measure (Oliver and
Simons, 2004). The ALS-18 correlates strongly with the original ALS,
with high internal consistency and good test-retest reliability. Ex-
ploratory and conﬁrmatory factor analysis determined that a three-
factor model of anxiety/depression, depression/elation and anger best
ﬁt the short form version of the ALS. Subsequent studies that have
sought to verify the psychometric properties of the ALS-18 with clinical
populations have conﬁrmed good convergent validity, strong construct
validity and high internal consistency (Aas et al., 2015; Look et al.,
2010).
The AIM is a 40-item questionnaire that measures the magnitude or
intensity with which an individual experiences his or her emotions
(Larsen and Diener, 1987). Aﬀect intensity is conceptualized as a trait
characteristic or individual diﬀerence and the AIM is focused on the
intensity, rather than frequency of emotions. The AIM has good psy-
chometric properties including strong test-retest reliability, internal
consistency, and discriminant and convergent validity (Bagozzi and
Moore, 2011; Larsen and Diener, 1987). Factor analyses of the AIM
indicated that it describes four correlated factors – positive aﬀectivity,
negative reactivity, negative intensity and positive intensity (Rubin
et al., 2011; Weinfurt et al., 1994).
The UPPS-P was selected speciﬁcally for two subscales related to
positive and negative urgency. Positive and negative urgency relate to
individual diﬀerences in propensity for impulsive actions or responses
driven by the experience of either positive or negative emotions, re-
spectively. The original measure, UPPS Impulsive Behavior Scale,
consisted of 45 items selected to create four factors of impulsivity –
negative urgency, lack of premeditation, lack of perseverance and
sensation seeking (Whiteside and Lynam, 2001). The UPPS was de-
monstrated to have good internal consistency and construct validity
and could adequately discriminate between healthy individuals and
those with psychopathology (Whiteside et al., 2005). A ﬁfth factor,
positive urgency, was added through the addition of 14 items, resulting
in the UPPS-P (Cyders et al., 2007). The ﬁve factor UPPS-P has good
internal consistency, test-retest reliability, and content validity (Cyders
et al., 2007; Whiteside et al., 2005).
The last questionnaire was the Substance Use Risk Proﬁle Scale
(SURPS) (Woicik et al., 2009). The SURPS is a 23-item measure of four
personality traits – hopelessness, sensation seeking, anxiety sensitivity
and impulsivity – that have been shown to be related to substance use.
It has good psychometric properties including concurrent and pre-
dictive validity as well as good sensitivity and speciﬁcity (Castellanos-
Ryan et al., 2013). The SURPS was included in the current study to
replicate the methods of previous reward positivity studies involving
substance dependent individuals (Baker, 2012; Baker et al., 2011).
The subscales/factors from the individual diﬀerences questionnaires
(AIM, ALS-18, SURPS and UPPS-P) have previously been demonstrated
to measure unique components of aﬀective processing (Cyders and
Smith, 2007; Look et al., 2010; Oliver and Simons, 2004; Rubin et al.,
2011; Weinfurt et al., 1994; Woicik et al., 2009). To this eﬀect, data
from the questionnaires were initially examined according to the three
factors from the ALS-18, four AIM factors, positive and negative ur-
gency, and the four personality traits identiﬁed by the SURPS for a total
of 13 subscales. In order to reduce the data and explore the relation-
ships between the questionnaires, relationships between the 13 sub-
scales were explored to determine whether the data was suitable for a
Principal Components Analysis (PCA). Finally, in order to examine the
eﬀect of individual diﬀerences on ERP components, participants were
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classiﬁed as ‘high’ and ‘low’ according to quartile scores for each of the
factors determined by the PCA.
2.4. Data acquisition and analysis
The EEG was recorded from 41 electrode sites using BrainVision
Recorder Software (Brainproducts, GmbH, Munich, Germany). The
electrodes were mounted in a ﬁtted nylon cap with a standard 10–20
layout and were referenced to a common ground. For the purpose of
artifact correction, the horizontal electrooculogram (EOG) was re-
corded from the external canthi of both eyes. The vertical EOG was
recorded from the suborbit of the right eye and electrode channel Fp2.
Inter-electrode impedances were kept below 20 kΩ and two electrodes
were placed on the right and left mastoids. The EEG data were sampled
at a rate of 250 Hz and were ampliﬁed by low-noise electrode diﬀer-
ential ampliﬁers with a frequency response of dc 0.017–67.5 Hz (90 dB
octave roll oﬀ).
Post processing was performed using Brain Vision Analyzer software
(Brain Products, GmbH). The EEG data were ﬁltered through a phase-
shift-free Butterworth ﬁlter with a passband of 0.10–20 Hz (24 dB oc-
tave roll oﬀ). For the Standard and Emotion T-maze tasks, an 800ms
epoch of data extending from 200ms prior to feedback stimulus onset
to 600ms following the stimulus was extracted from the continuous
EEG for analysis. In addition, for the Emotion T-Maze task a 1200ms
epoch of data extending from 200ms prior to IAPS picture onset to
1000ms following picture onset, corresponding to the time of picture
oﬀset, was also extracted for analysis. Ocular artifacts were corrected
using the eye movement correction algorithm described by Gratton
et al. (1983). The epochs were re-referenced to the average value re-
corded at the mastoid electrodes and baseline corrected by subtracting
from each sample the average activity recorded at that electrode during
the 200ms interval preceding stimulus onset. Muscular and other ar-
tifacts were removed using a±150 μV level and±35 μV step
threshold rejection criteria. The Hjorth nearest-neighbor correction was
applied to excessively noisy data for individual channels.
Ample evidence suggests the reward positivity is an electro-
physiological measure of RPE signals (Holroyd and Coles, 2002;
Holroyd and Yeung, 2012; Walsh and Anderson, 2012; Sambrook and
Goslin, 2015). To assess the neural response to reward and no-reward
stimuli, ERPs were created for each electrode and participant by aver-
aging the single-trial EEG according to feedback type (reward or no-
reward) for both the Standard and Emotion T-maze tasks. For the
Emotion T-maze task, reward and no reward ERPs were separately
created for the neutral, pleasant and unpleasant conditions. The reward
positivity was measured at electrode site FCz, where it typically reaches
maximum amplitude (Walsh and Anderson, 2012). For each partici-
pant, the average ERP waveform elicited by reward feedback was
subtracted from that of the corresponding no-reward feedback to create
a diﬀerence wave (Holroyd and Coles, 2002; Miltner et al., 1997).
Reward positivity amplitude was measured as the mean activity of the
diﬀerence wave within a 270–300ms window post-stimulus, as re-
commended in a meta-analysis by Sambrook and Goslin (2015). To
examine the eﬀect of emotional pictures on the RPE, we compared the
amplitude of the reward positivity to feedback following the pre-
sentation of emotionally valent pictures vs. the presentation of emo-
tionally neutral pictures.
For the Emotion T-maze task, data corresponding to the presenta-
tion of IAPS pictures were averaged for each participant and channel
separately for neutral, pleasant, and unpleasant pictures. The P300 was
measured as the mean activity at channel Pz within a 300–500ms
window, where it typically reaches maximum amplitude (Donchin and
Coles, 1988). LPP was measured as the mean activity at channel Pz and
examined throughout diﬀerent time windows as previously advised
(Hajcak et al., 2012; Hajcak et al., 2010). The window from 500 to
1000ms comprised the entire LPP complex. Activities from 500 to
750ms and from 750 to 1000ms were conceptualized as “early LPP”
and “late LPP”, respectively. In addition, the entire positivity com-
prising the P300 and LPP was measured as mean activity at Pz from 300
to 1000ms.
Data were statistically analyzed with SPSS v 15.0. In instances in
which the assumption of sphericity was violated (according to
Mauchly's sphericity test), a Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used to
mitigate Type 1 error rate.
3. Results
3.1. Questionnaires
Data were analyzed for 82 participants. Substance speciﬁc scores
and an overall substance use score were calculated from responses to
questions on the ASSIST v3.0. Thirty-six participants were classiﬁed as
“low risk”, as they reported minimal substance use; the remaining 46
“risky use” participants reported a minimum of moderate risk use for at
least one substance. Of those 46 reporting at least moderate risk, 27
reported moderate or high risk for more than one substance (poly-
substance use).1 There were no individuals who reported high risk use
of a speciﬁc substance and did not also report at least moderate risk use
of a second substance, therefore these individuals were classiﬁed as at
risk for polysubstance use. Independent t-tests did not ﬁnd any sig-
niﬁcant diﬀerences between males and females in regard to overall
substance use or speciﬁc substance use (all ps > .05).
Data from the individual diﬀerences questionnaires were initially
examined according to the subscales comprising each of the ques-
tionnaires. Preliminary analysis demonstrated that 12 of the 13 sub-
scales correlated at least 0.3 with one other subscale. Factorability was
further examined by observing the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of
sampling adequacy of 0.754, above the commonly recommended value
of 0.6 (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007), and Bartlett's test of sphericity
was signiﬁcant (x2 (78)= 456.85, p < .001). In addition, the diag-
onals of the anti-image correlation matrix were all over 0.5 and the
communalities were all above 0.3, conﬁrming that each subscale shared
some common variance with other subscales. Given these overall in-
dicators, PCA was used to identify and compute composite scores for
common factors underlying the questionnaire subscales.
Initial eigenvalues indicated that the ﬁrst four factors, which all had
eigenvalues> 1.0, explained 36%, 16%, 10% and 8% of the total
variance, respectively. The remaining factors all had eigenvalues less
than one. Upon examination of the correlations among the four factors,
it was determined that all correlations were smaller than±0.32,
therefore a varimax rotation was used in order to maximize the simple
structure and to ease the interpretation of the overall solution (see
Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). Following varimax rotation, the resulting
four factor solution explained 70% of the variance (Table 2). Inspection
of the factor loadings revealed the following observations. First, the
four subscales from the SURPS loaded mostly separately across the four
factors. Second, subscales assessing aﬀect intensity loaded according to
valence (i.e., positive and negative intensity loaded onto diﬀerent fac-
tors) and separately from lability and urgency. This was somewhat
surprising because intensity and lability, which have traditionally been
considered key dimensions of aﬀective instability, were separated here
into two separate factors, and further, because lability was grouped
together with urgency, which has not been widely considered within
the aﬀective instability literature. Third, the impulsivity and hope-
lessness scales from the SURPS also loaded onto the lability/urgency
factor. We therefore named this factor “reactivity” to reﬂect increased
responsivity to aﬀective stimuli as assessed by lability and urgency
subscales, and to distinguish it from aﬀective instability, which by
1 Data were also analyzed using an overall substance use score or GCR score
(see Baker et al., 2011); the results did not diﬀer from the results reported
above and were not statistically signiﬁcant.
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deﬁnition includes other aﬀective components such as aﬀect intensity.
Fourth, four subscales relating to anxiety and negative emotionality
loaded onto Factor 2, which we labelled “neuroticism”. Last, in ac-
cordance with the remaining SURPS loadings around which they
grouped, Factors 3 and 4 were labelled “positivity” and “sensation
seeking”, respectively. As the reactivity factor encompassed most of the
subscales relating to aﬀective instability (aside from the aﬀect intensity
subscales), this factor was used to represent aﬀective instability in the
subsequent analyses. A series of independent t-tests were run to in-
vestigate gender diﬀerences among the four factors. Females reported
signiﬁcantly greater levels of neuroticism (t(80)= 2.26, p < .05,
ƞp2= 0.06); no other comparisons were signiﬁcant (ps > .05).
Correlation and multiple regression analyses were conducted to
examine the relationship between overall substance use and the four
identiﬁed factors. A multiple regression model with all four factors as
predictors indicated that the four factors were correlated with sub-
stance use, R2= 0.220, F(4,77)= 5.431, p < .01. Table 3 summarizes
the correlation and regression results. As can be seen, reactivity and
sensation seeking positively correlated with overall substance use, in-
dicating those with higher scores on these factors tend to report higher
rates of substance use. Further, reactivity contributed more strongly
than sensation seeking to the regression. Neuroticism and positivity did
not contribute to the multiple regression model. As an exploratory
analysis, we investigated the relationships between the four factors and
speciﬁc substances, the results of which are reported in Appendix A.
3.2. ERP results
Fig. 3 illustrates the ERPs elicited by the Reward and No-Reward
feedback during the Standard and Emotion T-Mazes and associated
diﬀerence waves, averaged across participants separately for the Low
Risk and Risky Use groups. The ERPs for both groups revealed a typical
reward positivity maximal at channel FCz to both the Standard T-Maze
(Low Risk: M=−4.29 μV, SE= 0.50 μV; Risky Use: M=−3.72 μV,
SE= 0.61 μV) and Emotion T-Maze (Low Risk: M=−4.61 μV,
SE= 0.50 μV; Risky Use: M=−4.13 μV, SE= 0.49 μV). Contrary to
our prediction, a repeated measures ANOVA on reward positivity am-
plitude with maze condition (standard, emotion) as a within-subject
factor and Low Risk and Risky Use as a between-subject factor revealed
no eﬀect of maze conditions, group, or interaction (all ps > .05)
(Fig. 4).
To test the prediction that a larger reward positivity would be eli-
cited following the presentation of an emotional picture, we used a
repeated measures ANOVA with valence (neutral, pleasant, unpleasant)
entered as within-subject factors. There were no signiﬁcant eﬀects of
valence on the reward positivity (all ps > .05).
To test whether aﬀective reactivity had an eﬀect on the amplitude of
the reward positivity, participants were split into groups based on top
and bottom quartiles according to their score on the reactivity factor. A
repeated measures ANOVA on reward positivity amplitude with maze
condition (standard, emotion) as a within-subject factor and low
(n=21) and high (n=20) reactivity as a between-subject factor re-
vealed no eﬀect of maze condition, group, or interaction (all ps > .05).
But based on our prediction that individuals scoring high on aﬀective
instability would have a greater response to emotional pictures, which
in turn would increase the subsequent reward positivity, we compared
reward positivity amplitude across groups separately for trials in which
participants were shown an emotionally valent picture. Reward posi-
tivity amplitude was larger following emotionally valent pictures for
highly reactive (M=−5.46 μV, SE=0.68 μV, Fig. 5c) compared to
minimally reactive (M=−3.46 μV, SE=0.67 μV, Fig. 5a) individuals
(t(39)= 2.103, p < .05, ƞp2= 0.10; Fig. 6a and c). In contrast, there
was no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in reward positivity amplitude on neutral
picture trials between highly (M=−4.37 μV, SE=0.74 μV) and
minimally (M=−3.48 μV, SE=0.66 μV) reactive individuals (t
(39)= 0.903, p > .05; Figs. 5b, d and 6c). As an exploratory analysis,
diﬀerences in the amplitude of the reward positivity between groups
scoring high or low on the remaining factors (neuroticism, positivity,
and sensation seeking) were also examined. No signiﬁcant diﬀerences
in reward positivity amplitude were observed for any of the other
factors across either the Standard or Emotion T-mazes.
To test the prediction that reward positivity amplitude would be
larger in high-risk substance users who score high versus low on af-
fective reactivity, participants scoring high on substance use were ca-
tegorized according to their aﬀective reactivity scores. Of the 46 par-
ticipants reporting risky substance use, 14 scored in the top quartile for
aﬀective reactivity and eight scored in the bottom quartile. The am-
plitude of the reward positivity on trials with emotionally valent pic-
tures was larger for individuals reporting high aﬀective reactivity
(M=−5.53 μV, SE= 0.87 μV) compared to individuals reporting low
aﬀective reactivity (M=−2.16 μV, SE=1.21 μV) (t(20)=−2.30,
p < .05, ƞp2= 0.21) (Fig. 7). In comparison, no diﬀerence in the am-
plitude of the reward positivity was found between the groups fol-
lowing neutral pictures (t(20)=−0.763, p > .05). As an exploratory
analysis, the same independent t-tests were run on reward positivity
amplitude to the feedback following emotional stimuli in the emotion
task, for low-risk substance users reporting either high (n=6) or low
(n=13) aﬀective reactivity. There were no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in
reward positivity amplitude between groups (all ps > .05).
Diﬀerences in the positive deﬂection following presentation of the
IAPS pictures were initially examined with a two-way repeated measure
ANOVA with time (P3, 300–500ms; early LPP, 500–750ms; late LPP,
Table 2
Factor loadings and communalities based on a principal components analysis
with varimax rotation for 13 subscales from the AIM, ALS-18, SURPS and UPPS-
P (n=82), and factor loadings for 4-factor PCA solution.





SURPS - impulsivity 0.771







AIM - negative intensity 0.654 0.407
ALS-18 - anger 0.624 −0.47




AIM - positive aﬀectivity 0.819
SURPS - hopelessness 0.519 −0.682




Total Eigenvalue 4.64 2.04 1.35 1.08
% of variance 35.7 15.7 10.3 8.3
Cumulative % of
variance
35.7 51.4 61.8 70
Note: factor loadings< 0.4 are suppressed.
Table 3
Correlations of 4 PCA factors with overall substance use score and un-
standardized regression coeﬃcients (B).
Reactivity Neuroticism Positivity Sensation seeking
Correlation 0.409⁎⁎⁎ −0.034 −0.072 0.215⁎
B 8.146⁎⁎⁎ −0.673 −1.431 4.269⁎
Note: standardized regression coeﬃcients (β) were not reported as the factors
were previously standardized, thus the standardized regression coeﬃcient is
reﬂected in the correlation coeﬃcient.
⁎ p < .05.
⁎⁎⁎ p < .001.
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750–1000ms) and valence (neutral, pleasant, unpleasant) entered as
within-subject factors (Fig. 8). Main eﬀects for time (F(1.34,
108.8)= 59.8, p < .001, ƞp2= 0.43) and valence (F(1.84,
148.91= 145.3, p < .001, ƞp2= 0.64), and the interaction between
time and valence (3.16, 255.89=42.5, p < .001, ƞp2= 0.34) were all
signiﬁcant. In order to elucidate the eﬀect of valence on the mean ac-
tivity of the positive deﬂection in each of the time windows, three se-
parate repeated measure ANOVAs for each of the time windows
(300–500ms, 500–750ms, and 750–1000ms) with valence as the
within-subject factor (neutral, pleasant, unpleasant) indicated sig-
niﬁcant diﬀerences for all three conditions (all ps < .05). A series of
post hoc analysis with a Bonferroni adjustment revealed that mean
activity was initially largest for pleasant pictures in the time window of
the P300 (300–500ms), but after 500ms, mean activity was larger
following unpleasant pictures (Table 4). As mean activity was largest
following unpleasant pictures in both time windows of the early and
late LPP, for the remainder of analyses, the LPP was measured as mean
activity in the 500–1000ms window.
We predicted that individuals reporting high aﬀective instability
would have a larger neural response to emotional pictures. In order to
investigate the impact of aﬀective reactivity on the mean activity of the
P300 and LPP, a 3-way mixed-design repeated measures ANOVA on
ERP amplitude with aﬀective reactivity as a between-subject factor and
valence (neutral, pleasant, unpleasant) and time window (P300 and
LPP) as within-subject factors revealed no signiﬁcant eﬀects between
reactivity, valence, and time (all ps > .05). As an exploratory analysis,
the same ANOVA was run with high- and low-risk substance use entered
as the between-subject factor; similarly, none of the eﬀects were sig-
niﬁcant.
Finally, on trials with emotionally valent stimuli for highly reactive
individuals, an exploratory analysis failed to ﬁnd statistically sig-
niﬁcant correlations between reward positivity amplitude with either
P300 amplitude or LPP amplitude. The same analyses conducted across
all subjects also failed to reveal any statistically signiﬁcant relationships
(all ps > .05).
4. Discussion
The current study sought to 1) investigate the relationship between
aﬀect intensity, lability, and urgency, key dimensions in aﬀective in-
stability, and 2) to examine how individual diﬀerences in these aﬀec-
tive dimensions inﬂuence the neural mechanisms of cognitive control
related to substance use, namely, reward and emotion processing.
4.1. Dimensions of aﬀective instability in a non-clinical sample
Recent research has suggested that the construct of aﬀective in-
stability is multi-faceted and should be assessed using multiple ques-
tionnaires. The ALS and AIM, which respectively measure traits of af-
fective lability and intensity, have been speciﬁcally recommended for
this purpose (Marwaha et al., 2014; Renaud and Zacchia, 2012). In
addition to lability and intensity, we also investigated how positive and
negative urgency relate to aﬀective instability. While urgency has not
traditionally been considered a dimension of aﬀective instability, as it
characterizes the responsivity of an individual to their emotions, it
appears to be a closely related concept. Until recently, aﬀective in-
stability has been deﬁned and understood in the context of clinical
disorders in which it is a primary symptom (i.e. BPD). The current study
Fig. 3. Event-related brain potentials (ERPs) time-locked to the onset of reward/no reward feedback (at 0ms) measured at FCz (negative is plotted up by convention).
Diﬀerence waves (blue solid line) were calculated by subtracting the reward ERPs (red dotted line) from the no-reward ERPs (yellow dashed line). A: ERPs elicited by
the standard T-Maze for individuals reporting low substance use (n=36). B: ERPs elicited by the emotion T-maze for individuals reporting low substance use. C:
ERPs elicited by the standard T-maze for individuals reporting high substance use (n=46). D: ERPs elicited by the emotion T-maze for individuals reporting high
substance use. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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sought to understand the relationship between diﬀerent dimensions of
aﬀective instability within a non-clinical population. To do this, we
administered to undergraduate students the AIM, ALS, and the positive
and negative urgency scales from the UPPS, as well as the SURPS,
which measures personality traits that predict substance dependence.
An exploratory PCA on the subscales from all of the questionnaires
identiﬁed four factors that mostly loaded separately across the four
personality dimensions measured by the SURPS. Additionally, subscales
from the AIM loaded separately according to valence (i.e., positive and
negative aﬀect), and separately from a factor associated with the ALS
and urgency subscales. Results indicated that aﬀect lability, urgency,
and impulsivity were strongly related to each other. Speciﬁcally, the
factor on which impulsivity (SURPS) loaded most strongly also involved
positive and negative urgency, all of the subscales from the ALS (an-
xiety/depression, depression/elation, and anger), negative intensity
(AIM), and hopelessness (SURPS). We named this factor “reactivity” (or
aﬀective reactivity) as the subscales largely measured how individuals
respond to their emotions, as well as how quickly and easily their
emotions change. In comparison to the remaining factors identiﬁed by
the PCA, the reactivity factor is most closely related to aﬀective in-
stability, but diﬀers in that it excludes aﬀect intensity and includes
positive and negative urgency.
The other factors were named based on the personality dimensions
from SURPS that loaded separately across the remaining factors. The
second factor, neuroticism, included anxiety sensitivity (SURPS), ne-
gative reactivity and intensity (AIM), and lability between negative
emotions (anxiety/depression). The third factor, positivity, included
positive aﬀectivity and intensity (AIM), and a negative relationship
with hopelessness (SURPS). The fourth factor, sensation seeking
(SURPS), also included a negative relationship with anger (ALS).
Overall, the reactivity factor encompassed active changes (lability) or
behaviours (urgency) in response to emotions. The remaining factors
pertained to aﬀect intensity, which loaded separately by valence (i.e.,
negative emotions loaded on the neuroticism factor, positive emotions
loaded on the positivity factor). Finally, sensation seeking was pulled
out as a separate factor mostly unrelated to subscales measuring af-
fective dimensions. These results speak to a clear distinction between
the intensity with which individuals experience their emotion and how
reactive or ‘unstable’ their emotions are.
A lack of a concise, established deﬁnition of aﬀective instability has
recently come under criticism (Marwaha et al., 2014; Renaud and
Zacchia, 2012). Two proposed deﬁnitions of aﬀective instability suggest
that aﬀect intensity is a key component; however, the current results
indicate that, in a non-clinical population, aﬀect intensity loads sepa-
rately from both lability and urgency. This suggests that aﬀect intensity
represents a unique dimension of aﬀective processing and should be
considered as a separate concept in the conceptualization and mea-
surement of aﬀective instability. This distinction may not be clear when
examining dimensions of aﬀective instability in clinical populations.
For instance, Kuo and Linehan (2009) proposed that aﬀect intensity,
not lability, is responsible for emotional dysregulation observed in in-
dividuals with BPD. By contrast, Renaud and Zacchia (2012) observed
mixed results regarding aﬀect intensity in individuals with BPD and
postulated that this may be explained by high rates of comorbid PTSD,
thereby dampening responses to emotional stimuli. A better under-
standing of the diﬀerences between aﬀect intensity and reactivity could
indicate whether these processes separately impact emotional dysre-
gulation as observed across clinical disorders. Koenigsberg (2010) hy-
pothesized that there may be two subtypes of aﬀective instability, each
associated with diﬀerent psychological or personality disorders. As af-
fect intensity has traditionally been considered together with reactive
dimensions of aﬀective instability, it is unclear if conceptualizing in-
tensity as a separate trait would change our understanding of how af-
fective instability presents in clinical populations. For example, the
Fig. 4. Diﬀerence waves and associated scalp voltage maps. Diﬀerence waves were calculated by subtracting the reward ERPs from the no-reward ERPs at channel
FCz and are time-locked to the onset of feedback (at 0 ms). Scalp distributions were averaged from 270 to 300ms, the time in which reward positivity amplitude was
measured. A: diﬀerence waves for low- (red) and high-risk (yellow) substance users elicited by the standard T-maze task. B: diﬀerence waves for low- and high-risk
substance users elicited by the emotion T-maze task. C: scalp distribution of low-risk substance users in the standard T maze. D: scalp distribution of high-risk
substance users in the standard T maze. E: scalp distribution of low-risk substance users in the emotion T maze. F: scalp distribution of high-risk substance users in the
emotion T maze. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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relationship between lability and intensity may be quite diﬀerent across
disorders, and although they may both signiﬁcantly contribute to af-
fective instability in BPD, intensity may contribute less or diﬀerently to
aﬀective instability in PTSD. The fact that aﬀective instability has been
primarily researched in clinical populations complicates the under-
standing of its underlying dimensions as other symptoms or diﬃculties
associated with a given disorder may impact the expression of diﬀerent
dimensions of aﬀective instability. The current results help to elucidate
the makeup of aﬀective instability in a non-clinical population.
4.2. Aﬀective instability and substance use
The results of the PCA also allowed us to elucidate how diﬀerent
dimensions of aﬀective instability (i.e. lability and urgency) contribute
to increased risk of substance use. Of the four factors identiﬁed by the
PCA, only reactivity and sensation seeking predicted increased overall
substance use, with the correlation between aﬀective reactivity and
substance use being nearly twice as large as that between sensation
seeking and substance use. The importance of this relationship is bol-
stered by the ﬁnding that reactivity was a stronger predictor of sub-
stance use than all four personality dimensions assessed by the SURPS
(see Appendix A), a questionnaire designed to measure personality
traits associated with increased risk for substance abuse (Woicik et al.,
2009). Our results suggest that aﬀective reactivity is an important trait
that should be addressed when assessing and treating individuals with
SUDs. In comparison, aﬀect intensity did not predict substance use. The
reactivity factor encompasses increased emotional and behavioural
responses to emotional stimuli and can be considered an ‘active’ di-
mension of aﬀective instability. As such, individuals high on reactivity
are more inclined to act on emotional changes or distress by behaving
(i.e. consuming a substance) in such a way as to distract from, or add to
(in the case of positive urgency), their emotional experience. By con-
trast, aﬀect intensity is a more passive dimension, the degree to which
an individual feels their emotions is an internal experience and does not
necessarily equate to outward behaviour. Disassembling the compo-
nents of aﬀective processing may lead to a better understanding of the
relationship between components of aﬀective instability, which in turn
may help guide future research to more eﬀective treatment and pre-
vention methods.
4.3. Cognitive control, reward processing and substance use
In order to examine the impact of aﬀective instability and substance
use on neural mechanisms of cognitive control, we utilized the reward
positivity to assess reward processing. Speciﬁcally, the amplitude of the
reward positivity was taken as a measure of sensitivity to positive and
negative feedback, allowing individuals to learn from their environ-
ment and adapt their behaviour. In comparison to a series of previous
studies, in which Baker and colleagues found evidence of impaired
reward processing demonstrated through a truncated reward positivity
in a sample of undergraduate students reporting substance dependence
(Baker, 2012; Baker et al., 2011, 2016a, 2016b, 2017), our results were
mixed. Baker argued that the smaller amplitude of the reward positivity
in substance users reﬂected desensitization to non-drug rewards like the
nominal ﬁnancial gains used in the task. This hypothesis was supported
by a later study that found that substance dependent smokers displayed
a larger reward positivity to cigarette rewards in comparison to
monetary rewards (Baker et al., 2017; Baker et al., 2016a, 2016b).
Although the current study used the same questionnaire (ASSIT v3.0)
and methodology (Standard T Maze) as Baker and colleagues with a
Fig. 5. Event-related brain potentials (ERPs) time-locked to the onset of reward/no reward feedback (at 0ms) measured at FCz (negative is plotted up by convention).
Diﬀerence waves (blue solid line) were calculated by subtracting the reward ERPs (red dotted line) from the no-reward ERPs (yellow dashed line). A: ERPs elicited by
feedback stimuli following emotionally valent pictures for individuals reporting low reactivity (n=21). B: ERPs elicited by feedback stimuli following neutral
pictures for individuals reporting low reactivity C: ERPs elicited by feedback stimuli following emotionally valent pictures for individuals reporting high reactivity
(n=20). D: ERPs elicited by feedback stimuli following neutral pictures for individuals reporting high reactivity. (For interpretation of the references to colour in
this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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new sample of undergraduate students, we did not replicate their
ﬁnding of smaller reward positivity amplitude for individuals reporting
high-risk substance use compared to individuals reporting minimal
substance use.
Several possibilities could account for this failure to replicate the
ﬁnding of a smaller reward positivity in high-risk substance users. The
current study quantiﬁed substance use based on speciﬁc substance
scores (as suggested by the WHO), whereas Baker used quartile scores
that roughly corresponded to previously recommended cut-oﬀs for
substance dependence (GCR > 39.5) (Newcombe et al., 2005). How-
ever, this diﬀerence did not impact the current results as when we ran
the analyses using the overall substance use score/GCR score, as done
in the previous studies, the results remained unchanged. The key dif-
ference between the current study and those reported by Baker et al.
(2011, 2016a, 2016b, 2017) appears to be the degree of substance use
reported by the diﬀerent samples. The overall substance use score for
the top quartile in the current sample was 26.25, substantially lower
than rates of substance use reported in previous studies that found a
truncated reward positivity (> 39.5) (Baker, 2012; Baker et al., 2011,
2016a, 2016b). Based on eﬀect sizes from previous studies (Baker,
2012; Baker et al., 2011), it was determined that a minimum of 68
participants was required to have enough power to replicate the
ﬁnding. Yet despite the current study exceeding this number, partici-
pants reported lower rates of substance use, limiting the ability of the
current study to replicate the previous ﬁndings. It should also be noted
that even results with strong eﬀect sizes will not always be replicated
due to factors such as distribution of eﬀect sizes and sampling error
(Schimmack, 2012). Even with power set at 80%, there is a 20% chance
that a real statistical eﬀect will not be replicated. Thus, the current
results may be an example of expected non-replication.
4.4. Emotional stimuli and reward processing
We also predicted that we would observe an increased RPE signal to
feedback following the presentation of task-independent emotional
stimuli, as previously found in an fMRI study by Watanabe et al. (2013),
but failed to do so. Several reasons might account for this. First, the
current study utilized the reward positivity as a measure of the RPE
signal, whereas Watanabe and colleagues assessed the strength of the
RPE signal in the ventral striatum by examining the BOLD signal. Al-
though the eﬀect size of this result was not reported by Watanabe and
colleagues, it was noted that the eﬀect was only signiﬁcant when the
threshold was set at p < .05. It is therefore possible that the eﬀect of
emotional stimuli on the RPE signal is too small to be evident in the
reward positivity. Further, we adapted the task used by Watanabe and
colleagues in a number of ways as appropriate for use in an ERP study.
Key diﬀerences between the two versions of the task, which are ela-
borated below, included the behavioural/learning task, timing of
Fig. 6. Diﬀerence waves following reward feedback for individuals reporting low (red) and high (yellow) aﬀective reactivity following emotional valent (A) and
neutral (B) IAPS images on the emotion T-maze task. C: diﬀerence in reward positivity amplitude for low and high aﬀective reactivity following emotional and
neutral IAPS images. Error bars represent standard error. Note: negative is plotted up by convention. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure
legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Fig. 7. Diﬀerence waves following reward feedback for high-risk substance
users reporting low (red, n=8) and high (yellow, n=14) aﬀective reactivity
following emotionally valent images on the emotion T-maze task. (For inter-
pretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred
to the web version of this article.)
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presentation of stimuli, and the type of emotional stimuli used.
The Emotion T-Maze task used in the current study was a modiﬁed
version of the Standard T-Maze task, which has been used in a number
of ERP studies to successfully elicit the reward positivity (Baker and
Holroyd, 2009; Baker et al., 2011; Lukie et al., 2014). It is based on a
pseudo trial-and-error learning task in which the probability of re-
ceiving rewarding feedback is 50%, unbeknownst to participants. Par-
ticipants were encouraged to respond in a manner so as to maximize
reward feedback by selecting the alley that they believed the reward
was in. By contrast, the task used by Watanabe and colleagues was a
probabilistic learning task that participants were exposed to prior to the
neuroimaging session. Despite diﬀerences between the tasks, both al-
lowed for the production of RPE signals based on participants' predic-
tions. A second diﬀerence between the tasks concerned the stimulus
timing, which diﬀered in order to accommodate the relative timings of
the electrophysiological and hemodynamic responses. Namely, unlike
the study by Watanabe et al. (2013), participants in the Emotion T-
Maze controlled the duration of the alley ﬁxation period following
presentation the IAPS stimuli by pressing a button. Further, the reward
outcomes were displayed for 500ms less in the Emotion T-maze than in
the fMRI task. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely these changes had an
impact on the results, as both methods successfully elicited a RPE
signal.
Finally, the Emotion T-Maze used pictures selected from the IAPS,
whereas Watanabe and colleagues used fearful or neutral faces. The
majority of ERP studies investigating emotional processing have used
IAPS stimuli (see Hajcak et al., 2010 for review), as subjective arousal
ratings for IAPS stimuli have been found to be more arousing in com-
parison to aﬀective facial expressions (Britton et al., 2006). Facial af-
fective expressions are believed to require networks involved in emo-
tion recognition, while IAPS pictures predominantly involve emotional
evocation. Despite these diﬀerences, Britton et al. (2006) provided
evidence that both pictures depicting emotional scenes (IAPS) and
human faces displaying emotional expressions activate similar neural
networks (amygdala, hippocampus, ventral medial prefrontal cortex,
and visual cortex). However, processing of faces is a complex process
that involves an initial stage of encoding, followed by processing of
identity, changeable aspects of a face, and emotional expression, all of
which activate speciﬁc brain regions in addition to those in common
with the IAPS (Britton et al., 2006; also see Palermo and Rhodes, 2007
for review). Faces and facial expressions also hold special social sig-
niﬁcance; for example, the LPP is enhanced in response to the presence
of people and faces in otherwise neutral pictures (Ferri et al., 2012;
Weinberg and Hajcak, 2010). As we were interested in the impact of
individual diﬀerences in aﬀective instability, we chose to use pictures
from the IAPS instead of facial expressions to mitigate the impact of
individual diﬀerences in sensitivity to social stimuli and interactions.
However, stronger amygdala responses to aﬀective facial expressions in
comparison to scenes depicting emotionally stimulating content have
also been reported (Hariri et al., 2002). It is possible that the current
study's use of IAPS stimuli rather than emotional faces contributed to
the fact that we did not ﬁnd an increased RPE signal following emo-
tional stimuli. Yet conﬂicting with this possibility is the fact that the
IAPS pictures successfully elicited larger LPPs in response to pleasant
and unpleasant pictures in comparison to neutral pictures. As the LPP is
believed to represent activation of an extensive neural network, in-
cluding cortical and subcortical structures, the modulation of the am-
plitude of the LPP by IAPS pictures increases the likelihood the pictures
were processed by similar structures as were activated by emotional
facial expressions in Watanabe and colleagues' study.
4.5. Aﬀective instability and emotion processing
As expected, LPP amplitude was larger following emotionally valent
pictures in comparison to neutral pictures. However, in contrast to our
prediction that we would observe larger electrophysiological responses
to emotion processing in individuals reporting high levels of aﬀective
instability, we did not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the amplitude
of the P300 or LPP between individuals reporting high versus low levels
of reactivity. This is somewhat surprising as the LPP has been demon-
strated to be sensitive to other individual diﬀerences in personality. For
instance, Weinberg et al. (2016) found that individuals who reported an
early onset of MDD showed reduced LPP amplitude in response to re-
warding and threatening IAPS images. These ﬁndings are in line with
previous studies that demonstrated a reduced LPP to threatening sti-
muli in individuals both diagnosed with (Foti and Hajcak, 2010) and at
risk for depression (Kujawa et al., 2012). In a sample of adolescent
females, self and informant-reported traits of extraversion were posi-
tively associated with increased LPP amplitude, whereas there was no
eﬀect of neuroticism on the LPP (Speed et al., 2015). Reduced LPP
amplitude in response to aversive stimuli has also been observed in
individuals with Parkinson's disease who report high levels of apathy
(Dietz et al., 2013). The impact of individual diﬀerences in anxiety on
the LPP is less clear. Some studies have reported that anxious in-
dividuals exhibit larger LPP amplitudes in response to threatening sti-
muli (MacNamara and Hajcak, 2009, 2010), whereas others have found
less diﬀerentiation between unpleasant and neutral pictures (Weinberg
and Hajcak, 2011), and still others have reported that anxiety symp-
toms do not impact the amplitude of the LPP at all (Weinberg et al.,
2016).
In terms of individual diﬀerences relating speciﬁcally to aﬀective
instability, there have been few studies to date, and those that exist
have been within the context of BPD. One study found that individuals
with BPD exhibited a larger LPP in response to unpleasant IAPS pictures
in comparison to a control group (Marissen et al., 2010). Another
looked at the LPP in response to positive and negative words in young
women with BPD and found an enhanced LPP to negative words
(Auerbach et al., 2016). These results suggest there is a relationship
between the neural networks responsible for processing emotional
Fig. 8. Event-related brain potentials (ERPs) time-locked to the onset of IAPS
picture stimuli (stimulus onset at 0 ms) measured at channel Pz (negative is
plotted up by convention).
Table 4
Mean voltage and standard errors (μV) at Pz across three diﬀerent time win-
dows following presentation of neutral, pleasant, and unpleasant pictures from







Neutral 4.07 (0.44)⁎ 4.8 (0.33)⁎⁎⁎ 1.47 (0.25)⁎⁎⁎
Pleasant 6.41 (0.45)⁎⁎ 7.63 (0.36)⁎⁎⁎ 4.32 (0.27)⁎⁎⁎
Unpleasant 6.02 (0.48)⁎⁎ 8.55 (0.38)⁎⁎⁎ 5.10 (0.30)⁎⁎⁎
⁎ Mean P300 voltage in the neutral condition diﬀered signiﬁcantly
(p < .001) from the pleasant and unpleasant conditions.
⁎⁎ Mean P300 voltage in the pleasant condition was also signiﬁcantly greater
(p < .05) than in the unpleasant condition.
⁎⁎⁎ Mean voltage for both the early and late LPP diﬀered signiﬁcantly
(p < .001) from each other in all three conditions.
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stimuli and the LPP and BPD, of which aﬀective instability is a primary
symptom. As the current study examined aﬀective instability in a non-
clinical sample, it is likely that diﬀerences between groups were mild
relative to the more extreme expression of individual diﬀerences in
aﬀective processing seen in clinical disorders. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study that has examined the impact that non-
clinical individual diﬀerences in aﬀective instability have on neural
processing of emotional stimuli. It may be that these subtler individual
diﬀerences are too weak to elicit observable diﬀerences in the ampli-
tude of the LPP. Interestingly, a recent study also did not ﬁnd an impact
of self-reported trait mindfulness, which is associated with lower levels
of aﬀective instability, on the amplitude of the LPP (Cosme and Wiens,
2015).
The IAPS images used in the current study may also explain why we
failed to observe a diﬀerence in LPP amplitude between individuals
reporting high and low levels of aﬀective reactivity. Although the IAPS
images used in the current study produced the expected eﬀect on LPP
amplitude (larger for emotionally valent pictures, see Table 4), they
may have not been arousing enough to detect individual diﬀerences in
emotional processing. The LPP has been demonstrated to be sensitive to
more intense and arousing stimuli, such as erotica and threatening
scenes (see Hajcak et al., 2010 for review). Due to ethical concerns, the
current study did not use images involving erotica, threat, or violence.
One inﬂuential theory regarding the functional signiﬁcance of the
LPP is that it reﬂects increased visual attention that facilitates eﬃcient
processing of emotional information (Brown et al., 2012; also see
Hajcak et al., 2010, 2012 for review). Based on this theory, it is possible
that individuals reporting higher levels of aﬀective reactivity purposely
did not attend to emotionally evocative pictures due to the fact that
they were more likely to have an emotional response. The LPP ampli-
tude to unpleasant pictures has been demonstrated to decrease when
participants are instructed to attend to less arousing aspects of the
picture (Dunning and Hajcak, 2009; Hajcak et al., 2009). It is plausible
that individuals who are more responsive to their emotions, in the
context of a psychology experiment, may have regulated their emo-
tional response by decreasing their attention to the pictures overall or
to the more emotionally stimulating aspects of the pictures. If this were
the case, any potential impact of reactivity on the LPP amplitude may
have been masked by unsolicited emotional regulation strategies. Al-
ternatively, the LPP may not be sensitive to individual diﬀerences in
reactivity. As the LPP is believed to be generated by an extensive brain
network including subcortical and cortical structures (Liu et al., 2012),
it is diﬃcult to draw any ﬁrm conclusions regarding why it may or may
not be sensitive to these individual diﬀerences.
4.6. Aﬀective instability and reward processing
Despite some of our predictions being disconﬁrmed, other funda-
mental predictions were supported. We predicted that individuals re-
porting higher levels of aﬀective instability would be more sensitive to
feedback and therefore produce a larger reward positivity. Further, we
predicted that the reward positivity following emotional pictures on the
Emotion T-Maze would be even larger than those elicited by the
Standard T-Maze. As discussed above, a PCA identiﬁed a principal
factor of aﬀective reactivity, which encompassed active dimensions
related to aﬀective instability (i.e., lability and urgency). As this factor
was most closely related to aﬀective instability and demonstrated a
signiﬁcant relationship with substance use, we used scores on this
factor to examine the impact of aﬀective reactivity on neural me-
chanisms of reward and emotion processing. In fact, individuals re-
porting greater levels of reactivity only displayed a larger reward po-
sitivity following emotionally valent pictures. In comparison, the
amplitude of the reward positivity elicited by the Standard T-Maze and
following neutral pictures on the Emotion T-Maze did not diﬀer be-
tween individuals reporting high and low reactivity (see Figs. 5 and 6).
Watanabe et al. (2013) found a psychophysiological interaction
between activation of the amygdala in response to fearful faces, and an
increased RPE signal in the striatum following fearful (in comparison to
neutral) faces. They interpreted this ﬁnding based on two salient ob-
servations from the literature. First, emotional stimuli hold evolu-
tionary importance and are automatically processed faster than non-
emotional stimuli (Brosch et al., 2010). Second, the RPE signal is pro-
posed to be generated by phasic DA changes in response to outcomes
that are better or worse than expected, providing a crucial neural signal
for reinforcement learning (Holroyd and Coles, 2002). Watanabe et al.
(2013) therefore proposed that a neural system for processing facial
expressions can facilitate environmental navigation in order to max-
imize rewards. The results from the current study are partially con-
sistent with the observation of an increased RPE signal following
emotional stimuli; however, the amplitude of the reward positivity was
only increased for individuals reporting higher levels of reactivity.
Those participants who reported increased responsivity to their emo-
tions showed a larger reward positivity following emotionally valent
pictures. Building on the hypothesis of Watanabe and colleagues, these
results suggest that individuals who are more reactive to emotional
stimuli may activate neurological networks related to emotional pro-
cessing more strongly, which in turn enhances RPE signals. Yet con-
ﬂicting with this hypothesis is a lack of evidence for enhanced emo-
tional processing in individuals reporting higher levels of reactivity, as
measured by the amplitude of the LPP. Additionally, the amplitude of
the LPP did not signiﬁcantly correlate with the amplitude of the reward
positivity. Nevertheless, as previously discussed, it is unclear precisely
what process the LPP reﬂects, and the relationship between self-re-
ported aﬀective reactivity and neural measures of emotion processing
remains uncertain.
The eﬀect of emotional stimuli on neural RPE signals is not well
established. In addition to Watanabe and colleagues' ﬁnding that task-
independent emotional stimuli appeared to increase the RPE signal, two
recent ERP studies examined the relationship between state and trait
aﬀect. One study found no main eﬀect of trait positive or negative aﬀect
on the size of the feedback related negativity (FRN, i.e., the negative
deﬂection in the ERP) to negative feedback, but did ﬁnd an interaction
between state and trait emotions and FRN amplitude (Riepl et al.,
2016). Speciﬁcally, Riepl and colleagues found that individuals re-
porting high trait negative aﬀect produced larger FRNs following an
anger induction, but not following fear or happiness inductions. The
second ERP study reported smaller reward positivity amplitudes in
neutral and fearful conditions in individuals reporting high trait anxiety
in comparison to those reporting low trait anxiety, but only in response
to smaller magnitude outcomes (Wang et al., 2017). The diﬀerence in
reward positivity amplitude was not observed in happy conditions.
Wang and colleagues hypothesized that individual diﬀerences in an-
xiety led to an expectation bias that was diminished in positive emo-
tional conditions. The relationship between state and trait aﬀective
processes and reward processing appears to be complicated, with some
evidence that the interaction between state and trait aﬀect impacts
neural mechanisms of reward processing. The results of the current
study partially support previous ERP studies in that only those in-
dividuals reporting high trait aﬀective reactivity showed a larger re-
ward positivity following emotionally valent pictures (state aﬀect).
These ﬁndings add to a growing literature regarding the sensitivity
of the reward positivity in response to individual diﬀerences in per-
sonality. As it is well established that the reward positivity reﬂects re-
ward processing (i.e. reward prediction errors) (Sambrook and Goslin,
2015), it is not surprising that it is sensitive to a number of individual
diﬀerences related to reward sensitivity (Holroyd and Umemoto, 2016;
Proudﬁt, 2015). Factors related to reward sensitivity include reward
responsiveness (i.e., the ‘liking’ of rewards), and approach motivation
(i.e., ‘wanting’ of rewards) (Baskin-Sommers and Foti, 2015). Individual
diﬀerences may be visible in the amplitude of the reward positivity in a
number of personality traits and clinical symptoms related to reward
sensitivity (see Holroyd and Umemoto, 2016 for review). Smillie et al.
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(2011) found a larger reward positivity in individuals reporting higher
levels of extraversion in comparison to those individuals who identiﬁed
as being introverted. They concluded that extraversion, characterized
by behavioural approach and agency, is a putatively DA-based trait that
was reﬂected in the increased reward positivity, demonstrating the
sensitivity of the reward processing system to individual diﬀerences in
personality. In 2014, Cooper, Duke, Pickering, and Smillie replicated
and expanded on the observation that extraverted individuals displayed
a larger reward positivity. Speciﬁcally, they explored the impact of
extraversion, impulsivity, and reward sensitivity/anhedonia, traits
considered to be constructs of the behavioural activation/approach
system, as well as individual diﬀerences in anticipatory and con-
summatory pleasure. Individuals reporting higher levels of extraversion
and anticipatory pleasure had larger reward positivities, whereas other
individual diﬀerences such as impulsivity, reward sensitivity, and
consummatory pleasure did not impact the amplitude of the reward
positivity. This was taken as evidence that personality traits related to
behavioural approach (extraversion) and anticipatory positive aﬀect
(anticipatory pleasure) are partially related to variation in the dopa-
minergic system. Additional studies have found a larger reward posi-
tivity in individuals reporting greater responsiveness or sensitivity to
rewards (i.e. agency, drive, and anticipatory excitement) (Bress and
Hajcak, 2013; Umemoto and Holroyd, 2017).
This may also be in line with research that has found a smaller re-
ward positivity in individuals reporting symptoms of depression (see
Proudﬁt, 2015 for review). This has been observed in non-clinical
samples of undergraduate students reporting depressive symptoms (Foti
& Hajcak et al., 2009; Umemoto and Holroyd, 2017), as well as in in-
dividuals diagnosed with major depressive disorder (MDD) (Liu et al.,
2014). Proudﬁt (2015) proposed that a blunted reward positivity may
act as a biomarker, or neural indicator of reduced reward sensitivity. At
the crux of the relationship between depression and impaired reward
processing is anhedonia, or the inability to experience pleasant events
as pleasurable. Liu et al. (2014) found reduced amplitude of the reward
positivity was related to increased symptoms of anhedonia in both in-
dividuals with MDD and a control group. Further, Foti and colleagues
(2014) found the reduced reward positivity in individuals with MDD
was driven by a lack of reactivity in response to positive events.
Understood in this context, it might be expected that individuals
who are more responsive to emotional stimuli (i.e. those high on af-
fective reactivity) would also be more sensitive to rewards and there-
fore would be expected to demonstrate the opposite pattern as that
observed in individuals reporting high levels of anhedonia. Rewards are
deﬁned by their pleasure or hedonic impact (Berridge and Robinson,
1998). The reactivity factor in the current study assessed responsivity to
emotional stimuli, which may be considered a facet of reward sensi-
tivity if rewards are conceptualized as positive emotional experiences.
Based on previous ﬁndings of the reward positivity being sensitive to
individual diﬀerences in reward sensitivity, it is therefore not surprising
that the amplitude of the reward positivity was observed to be larger in
individuals reporting greater aﬀective reactivity.
Interestingly, a larger reward positivity in individuals with higher
levels of reactivity was only observed following emotionally salient
pictures, which supported our prediction of increased reward proces-
sing following emotional stimuli in individuals who are more reactive
to aﬀective stimuli. This may suggest that these individuals were sti-
mulated by the emotional pictures and in turn paid closer attention
and/or were more engaged in the task. There is mounting evidence that
the reward positivity is sensitive to the degree to which participants are
engaged in the task (Sambrook and Goslin, 2015). For example, Yeung
et al. (2005) found that the amplitude of the reward positivity was
larger during tasks in which participants actively chose a response
compared to passively observing the feedback, and also when they re-
ported greater involvement in the task. The ﬁnding that the reward
positivity was larger for individuals reporting higher levels of aﬀective
reactivity only after emotionally salient pictures may speak to the
pictures activating or motivating individuals to be more engaged in the
task and more invested in the reward outcomes.
4.7. Aﬀective instability, substance use, and reward processing
A primary goal of the current study was to examine the impact of
individual diﬀerences in aﬀective instability on substance use and re-
ward processing. Although we did not ﬁnd a truncated reward posi-
tivity in high-risk substance users, as we predicted, the reward posi-
tivity following emotionally valent stimuli was larger for high-risk
substance users reporting high levels of reactivity than those reporting
low levels of reactivity. This supports our prediction that high levels of
aﬀective reactivity would ‘normalize’ an otherwise truncated reward
positivity in high-risk substance users, which is consistent with the
proposal that there are multiple paths to addiction (Baker, 2012). A
spectrum of biological and psychological traits that increase the risk of
substance misuse may interact non-linearly or otherwise be diﬃcult to
decipher due to counteracting eﬀects. On the one hand, the previously
observed truncated reward positivity provides evidence that individuals
with SUDs exhibit impaired reward processing, particularly in relation
to naturally occurring (as opposed to drug-related) rewards (Baker
et al., 2011; Baker et al., 2016b). On the other hand, the results of the
current study suggest that individuals reporting higher levels of aﬀec-
tive reactivity are more likely to report risky use of substances, which is
in line with previous research demonstrating that substance use may
serve to dampen or decrease negative emotions (Cheetham et al., 2010;
Measelle et al., 2006). Despite aﬀective reactivity increasing the like-
lihood of an individual reporting problematic substance use, it also
appears to potentiate reward processing in the presence of emotional
stimuli. Our observation that high levels of aﬀective reactivity increase
the reward positivity following emotional pictures is in line with this
idea. Taken together, whereas it was previously demonstrated that
substance dependent individuals exhibit impaired reward sensitivity
(see Baker et al., 2011), our results suggest that aﬀective reactivity may
be associated with increased reward sensitivity. These results suggest
two diﬀerent populations of substance users: one that is associated with
impaired reward processing, and another that is associated with in-
creased reactivity and enhanced reward processing.
A better understanding of the psychological and biological risks for
substance use may enable us to tailor treatment approaches for in-
dividuals struggling with SUDs. For instance, the results of the current
study suggest that an individual with a SUD who is highly reactive to
emotional stimuli might process emotions and rewards diﬀerently than
a substance dependent individual with low aﬀective reactivity. It re-
mains to be seen if high levels of aﬀective reactivity can be harnessed as
a potentially protective factor against impaired reward processing, or if
high aﬀective reactivity increases risk for substance misuse above and
beyond the risk associated with impaired reward processing.
5. Conclusion
The current study investigated the impact of aﬀect on cognitive
control by examining, ﬁrst, the diﬀerent dimensions of aﬀective in-
stability in a non-clinical sample, and second, how these dimensions
impact the neural mechanisms of reward and emotion processing as-
sociated with substance use. In exploring the relationship between as-
pects of aﬀective instability, we found evidence for a unique factor
(aﬀective reactivity) that included traits related to aﬀective lability,
urgency, and impulsivity; this factor also predicted higher rates of
substance use in an undergraduate student population. Although the
current study lacked suﬃcient statistical power to replicate the ob-
servation of a smaller reward positivity in substance dependent in-
dividuals, the results support the notion of multiple paths to proble-
matic substance use, and further suggest that aﬀective reactivity should
be considered when assessing and treating SUDs.
Importantly, we found evidence of a signiﬁcant role of aﬀect on
C.N. Bodkyn and C.B. Holroyd International Journal of Psychophysiology 146 (2019) 1–19
15
cognitive control. Speciﬁcally, following the presentation of emotional
stimuli, individuals who reported higher levels of aﬀective reactivity
produced an enhanced reward positivity, which is indicative of in-
creased reward processing by anterior cingulate cortex, an important
neural area for cognitive control (Holroyd and Yeung, 2012; Holroyd
and Umemoto, 2016). One hypothesis is that in emotionally salient
situations, aﬀective reactivity may act similarly to reward sensitivity
and may act to recruit additional cognitive resources such as attention,
task engagement, and neurological networks related to emotional pro-
cessing. With regard to substance use, these results suggest that
individuals who report increased aﬀective reactivity also display in-
creased cognitive control via enhanced reward processing. Taken to-
gether, these results suggest individual diﬀerences in aﬀective re-
activity impact neural mechanisms of reward processing that, in turn,
aﬀect cognitive control.
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Appendix A
We were interested in comparing the utility of the reactivity factor identiﬁed by the PCA in predicting substance use to the predictive power of
the personality traits assessed by the SURPS, a questionnaire intended to assess personality traits associated with increased substance use (Woicik
et al., 2009). To do this, we ﬁrst regressed the PCA scores for the factor we named reactivity on the overall substance use score. We found reactivity
signiﬁcantly predicted increased substance use, R2= 0.168, F(1,80)= 16.116, p < .001. Next, we regressed the four personality dimensions as-
sessed by the SURPS on substance use. The overall model also signiﬁcantly predicted increased substance use, R2= 0.137, F(4,77)= 3.062,
p < .05, but not as strongly as reactivity. Table A1 summarizes the correlation and regression results for the SURPS traits
Table A1
Correlations with overall substance use, unstandardized (B) and standardized (β) regression coeﬃcients.
Hopelessness Anxiety sensitivity Impulsivity Sensation seeking
Correlation 0.229⁎ −0.002 0.209⁎ 0.274⁎⁎
B 1.347 −0.47 0.957 1.391
β 0.202 −0.058 0.84 0.236
⁎ p < .05.
⁎⁎ p < .01.
In order to explore further the relationship between the four factors identiﬁed in the current study and substance use, we examined correlations
between the factors and self-reported use of speciﬁc substances (Table A2). Reactivity and sensation seeking were associated with increased use of
cannabis, whereas reactivity was also associated with increased use of tobacco and amphetamines. Neuroticism and positivity appeared to be
protective factors and were associated with lower use of cocaine, sedatives, and opioids. Notably, alcohol did not correlate signiﬁcantly with any of
the factors.
Table A2
PCA factors correlations with speciﬁc substance use scores.








⁎ p < .05.
⁎⁎ p < .01.
⁎⁎⁎ p < .001.
Finally, we examined correlations between speciﬁc substance use scores and the four personality dimensions included in the SURPS (Table A3).
In comparison to the relationships between speciﬁc substances and the PCA factors, none of the SURPS factors signiﬁcantly correlated with tobacco
use. This suggests that the relationship between tobacco and reactivity is likely due speciﬁcally to dimensions of aﬀectivity reactivity that are not
assessed by the SURPs (lability and urgency), rather than to impulsivity. Similar to the PCA factors, none of the SURPS traits signiﬁcantly correlated
with alcohol use.
Table A3
SURPS dimensions correlations with speciﬁc substance use scores.
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Table A3 (continued)
Hopelessness Anxiety sensitivity Impulsivity Sensation seeking
Opioids 0.285⁎⁎
Hallucinogens 0.291⁎⁎
⁎ p < .05.
⁎⁎ p < .01.
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